

Systemic Analysis of Software Intensive System Acquisition Issues



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Overarching Questions ...

- ***Why do we always seem to be trying to solve the same problems in our software intensive programs?***
- ***How do we really improve? Do we know where to start?***
- ***Are we focusing on the symptoms or the causes of our program issues?***

Tri-Service Assessment Initiative History

- ***TAI Initiated by OSD in 1998 to address repeated performance shortfalls attributed to software***
 - ***Mission - Implement independent program assessments into standard acquisition practice to help improve program performance***
- ***In May 2000, the Defense Science Board recommended independent assessments for all ACAT I-III programs***
- ***Independent Expert Program Review (IEPR) Policy***
 - ***Initially included in DoD 5000.2-R***
 - ***Now addressed in FY03 Defense Authorization Act, Section 804 - Improvement of Software Acquisition Processes - acquisition evaluation and improvement requirements***

Program and Enterprise Focus

Provide objective performance information to DoD decision makers:

- ***Provide assistance directly to DoD Program Managers to help them identify and correct program issues that impact individual program performance***
- ***Provide information directly to DoD Enterprise Managers about recurring systemic issues that impact performance across the DoD program base***

Tri-Service Assessment Initiative Activities



- ***Independent Expert Program Reviews (IEPR)***
- ***Single Program Focus***
- ***Objective - Improve Program Performance***

- ***Cross-Program Analysis***
- ***Enterprise Focus***
- ***Objective - Identify and Characterize Recurring Performance Factors***

TAI Activities are Based on an Integrated Assessment Architecture

Systemic Analysis

- ***Identifies recurring program performance issues, risks, and problems***
- ***Quantifies the extent to which these issues are observed***
- ***Determines the cause and effect relationships between identified program performance issues***
- ***Allocates issue responsibility within the DoD acquisition management structure***

Systemic Analysis Phases

Phase 1 - Completed July 2001

- *Top down analysis approach*
- *Initial models - proof of concepts*
- *Assessment architecture integration*
- *Initial data set - 10 assessments*

Phase 2 - Completed December 2002

- *Bottom up analysis approach*
- *Based on quantification of recurring issues and sequences*
- *Information driven analysis objectives*
- *Systemic database*
- *Extended data set - 23 assessments*

Phase 3 - Began January 2003

- *Phase 2 transition - 32 assessments*
- *Predictive issue pattern analysis*
- *Quantification of program issue impacts*
- *Architecture and analysis process improvements*

TAI Assessment Architecture




- **Identify and prioritize Program issues**
- **Develop value-added recommendations**
- **Generates consistent information sets**

- **Generic Program issue structure**
- **Defines assessment “scope”**
- **Flexible typology**

Both Components are Required for Individual Program Assessment and Systemic Cross-Program Analysis

Assessment Process Model



Assessment Information Model


- ***User / Customer***
- ***Schedule***
- ***Technical Product***
- ***Technical Process***
- ***Management***
- ***Resources***
- ***Financial***
- ***Mission Requirements***
- ***Environment***
- ***Program Specific***

Management Issue Typology Example


<i>Issue Category</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Sub-Issue</i>
<i>5. Management</i>	<i>5.1 Acquisition Strategy/Process</i>	<i>5.1.1 Acceptability</i>
		<i>5.1.2 Feasibility</i>
		<i>5.1.3 Suitability</i>
	<i>5.2 Program Planning</i>	<i>5.2.1 Acceptability</i>
		<i>5.2.2 Feasibility</i>
		<i>5.2.3 Suitability</i>
	<i>5.3 Program & Program Management</i>	<i>5.3.1 Organization</i>
		<i>5.3.2 Suitability</i>
		<i>5.3.3 Change Tolerance</i>
	<i>5.4 Contracting and Subcontracting</i>	<i>5.4.1 Conditions- Constraints</i>
		<i>5.4.2 Cost Accounting</i>
		<i>5.4.3 Progress Tracking</i>
		<i>5.4.4 Arrangements</i>
		<i>5.4.5 Timeliness</i>
		<i>5.4.6 Change Management</i>
<i>5.5 Communication</i>	<i>5.5.1 Interfaces</i>	
	<i>5.5.2 Openness</i>	
	<i>5.5.3 Teamwork</i>	

Systemic Analysis Process

Program Assessment Results



Systemic Terminology




List of Banned Words

(B-Words)

- ***Infrastructure***
- ***Paradigm***
- ***Vision***
- ***Stakeholder***
- ***Overarching***
- ***Taxonomy***
- ***Meta - Anything***
- ***Business Process***
- ***Reengineering***
- ***Disambiguate***
- ***Seamless***
- ***Ideate***
- ***Mentor - Mentee***
- ***Enplanement***
- ***Disaggregate***
- ***Processcentric***
- ***Object Oriented***
- ***Y2K (Retired)***
- ***Better-Faster-Cheaper***
- ***Cartonization***
- ***Best Practice***
- ***Acluistic***

Data Management


Program Assessment Results




Data and Analysis Limitations

- ***Customer constraints on the scope of the individual assessments***
- ***Degree of individual assessment adherence to the TAI assessment architecture***
 - ***education and experience***
 - ***inherent team biases***
 - ***degree of assessment detail***
 - ***architecture design***
- ***Size of the assessment program base***
 - ***limits comparative analysis by distribution factor***
 - ***impacts degree of data self-normalization***
- ***Variance inherent in quantifying subjectively derived information***
- ***Lack of quantifiable issue impact data***
- ***Lack of successful program data***
- ***Time sensitive issue validity***
- ***Complexity of program issue interactions***
- ***Program level vs. enterprise level responsibility bias***


Assessment Distribution



Distribution of Assessments by Service



Distribution of Assessments by ACAT Level



Distribution of Assessments by Domain

Systemic Analysis Executive Summary

Recurring Issue Trends

- ***Exist across assessed programs***
- ***Regardless of program characteristics***
- ***They are more prevalent than expected***
- ***Traditional acquisition and development problems have yet to be adequately addressed***
- ***Policies and decisions related to identified issues have a long program impact life span***
- ***New recurring issues are emerging as DoD acquisition strategies and technologies change***

Systemic Analysis Executive Summary

Program Performance Issues

- ***Causative issues produce different performance symptoms in different programs***
 - ***single issue can cause many symptoms***
 - ***many unique issue combinations***
 - ***relatively complex performance interactions***
- ***The predominant number of identified issues are “triggering issues”, not symptoms***
- ***We continue to focus on the symptoms with little success***
- ***Traditional solutions and approaches are predominantly “stovepiped”***
- ***Even the “basics” in many instances are not implemented adequately***

Systemic Analysis Executive Summary

Program Failure


- ***Is related to a combination of unrealistic enterprise constraints / expectations and poor program execution***
- ***Enterprise level issues materially impact program performance***
- ***Program specific management and technical capability are primary and critical issues***
- ***Cost is the primary “managed to” constraint (program survival)***
- ***The gap between “program expectations” and “program performance” is significant across the board***

Critical Program Performance Problems

<i>Identified Issues</i>	<i>Relative Occurrence</i>
<i>Process Capability</i>	91 %
<i>Organizational Management</i>	87 %
<i>Requirements Management</i>	87 %
<i>Product Testing</i>	83 %
<i>Program Planning</i>	74 %
<i>Product Quality - Rework</i>	70 %
<i>System Engineering</i>	61 %
<i>Process Adherence</i>	52 %
<i>Program Schedule</i>	48 %
<i>Interoperability</i>	43 %
<i>Decision Making</i>	43 %
<i>...</i>	
<i>Configuration Management</i>	26%

Issue Responsibility Allocations

Complex issues with multiple interactions across all levels of DoD management



Issue Responsibility

Congress - includes Congressional influence as well as program external environmental factors

DoD - includes DoD policy, directives and guidance

Service - includes Service level policy, directives and guidance

Program Manager - includes all program organic PM-level responsibilities, from both the acquirer and supplier (developer) perspectives

Systems Engineering - includes all system engineering-level responsibilities from both the acquirer and supplier perspectives


Working Level - includes all the responsibilities of the development staff executing the program-related tasks

Under pressure, Program Managers make trade-off decisions that impact, in order:

- ***Development progress***
- ***Product technical performance***
- ***Product quality and rework***
- ***System usability***
- ***Cost***

Cause and Effect Impacts


- ***Process Capability*** problems result in:
 - ***Inadequate Testing***
 - ***Poor Change Management***
 - ***Poor Product Quality***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***
- ***Requirements Management*** problems result in:
 - ***Poor Product Quality***
 - ***Product Rework***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***
- ***Organizational and Program Management*** problems result in:
 - ***Inadequate Program Planning***
 - ***Responsibility Conflicts***
 - ***Poor Communications***
 - ***Product Rework***
 - ***Progress Shortfalls***



Recurring Issue Patterns

- ***The diversity of the recurring issue sequences reinforces the complex nature of the interactions and relationships between identified issues***
- ***The large number of unique issue sequences reinforces the need to focus attention on the causative, or triggering, issues***
- ***The expected cause and effect issue relationships are clearly evident in the data***
- ***Solutions will be equally complex***

Symptom or Cause?



Peter M. Senge
The Fifth Discipline

Technical and Management Processes

Analysis Results

- ***91% of the assessments had process capability issues (75% triggers)***
- ***52% of the assessments had process adherence issues (63% triggers)***
- ***35% of the assessments had no adherence issues but still had capability issues***
- ***Technical vs. Management Process Issues - 5:1 Ratio***
- ***Capability vs. Adherence Issues - 5:1 Ratio***
- ***Predominant deficiencies: requirements, risk / measurement, testing, systems engineering, change management***

Implications

- ***False assumption that organizational process adherence equates to effective program process capability***
- ***Adherent organizations still have significant performance shortfalls***
- ***Key process concerns:***
 - organizational standard vs. program process requirement***
 - impacts of program constraints***
 - large program team process incompatibilities***

Process Examples

- ***Software versions are not under CM control - poor change management - “fixed” defects delivered to the field - “lost” software baselines***
- ***Incompatibility of software processes across subcontractors resulted in the incompatibility of products delivered for integration***
- ***Software requirements specifications written by systems engineers without input from software engineers - specifications reflected more design than requirements***
- ***20,000 requirements managed manually***
- ***Risk identification without communication or risk management***
- ***Concurrent SAIV and CAIV management emphasis***

Process Issues Model

<p>No Processes in Place</p>	<p>Processes in Place - Total Program Team</p>							<p>No Processes in Place</p>
<p>Rudimentary Processes are Missing</p>	<p>Not Following Established Processes</p>			<p>Following Established Processes</p>				<p>Innovative Processes are Missing</p>
	<p>Process Adherence Issues</p>			<p>Process Capability Issues</p>			<p>Capable Processes</p>	
	<p>Under-performed Processes</p>	<p>De-graded Processes</p>	<p>Ad Hoc Critical Processes</p>	<p>Outstripped Processes</p>	<p>Uncoordinated Team Processes</p>	<p>Inadequate Standard Processes</p>	<p>Pro Forma Processes</p>	

Systems Engineering

Analysis Results

- ***61% of the assessments had systems engineering issues (23% triggers)***
- ***11 of the 16 programs that have requirements issues have SE issues***
- ***43% of the assessments have interoperability issues (50% triggers)***
- ***Predominant deficiencies: non-existent SE, lack of SE expertise, poor SE implementation, dispersion of SE responsibility and authority, existing SE inadequate for program requirements***

Implications

- ***Cost overruns, schedule slips and rework will continue to plague programs***
- ***The most technically complex systems have the most systems engineering issues***
- ***Interoperability of systems is in doubt***
- ***Rapid exploitation of new/innovative technology is difficult***

Systems Engineering Examples

- ***No end-to-end facilities for system level integration and test - full functionality first integrated and tested on the aircraft***
- ***Multiple processes and methodologies for loading different software applications on the platform***
- ***No final technical trade-off decision authority - Systems Engineering by committee***
- ***Technical task allocations driven by profit objectives, not by domain experience and capability***
- ***Integration used as a substitute for up-front systems engineering***
- ***Family of systems - interoperability mandate without establishing technical or management authority across programs - politically allocated responsibilities***

A Primary Systems Engineering Issue

System Interoperability

- ***Is not adequately planned, funded, or managed***
- ***It is a program rather than an enterprise allocated responsibility***
- ***“Family of Systems” management is largely ad hoc - no enterprise portfolio view - unfunded mandates***
- ***A number of new interoperability issues are emerging***
 - ***complex program organizational management***
 - ***complex system testing***
 - ***systems engineering and architecture shortfalls***
- ***Current acquisition strategy trends will most likely make these issues more pervasive***
 - ***direct source Congressional funding***
 - ***acquisition responsibility reallocations***

Analysis Summary

- ***The current DoD program issue profile shows little positive impact from past corrective actions, initiatives, and policy***
- ***The Program Manager and the Development Team must address the majority of the program issues, even if they are caused by enterprise level decisions or behaviors***
- ***Causative issues multiply downstream***
- ***The Program Team creates many of their own performance problems***
- ***There are no “single issue” program performance drivers***

Acquisition Trends - Emerging Issues

- ***Supplier program management and control***
- ***Direct congressional to supplier “plus up” funding***
- ***Massive mission based acquisition and supplier organizations***
- ***Increasing system interoperability and codependency***
- ***Extensive design for mission resiliency***
- ***Fewer and less experienced resources***
- ***Increasing cost consciousness***
- ***Technology integration and update***
- ***CMMI, Evolutionary Spiral, Capability Based Acquisition, Best Practices, others ...***

Systemic Analysis Model

ENTERPRISE LEVEL

Congress

DoD

Service

Program LEVEL

Program
Manager

Systems
Engineering

Working
Level

Program Decision Space

Acquisition Requirements

- Process
- Politics
- Strategy
- Assumptions

Policy
Culture

Expectations

- Cost
- Schedule
- Performance
- Quality

Constraints

- Funding
- Resources
- Time
- Capability

Mission
Allocation

Program
Portfolio
Management

Implementation Issues

- Complexity
- Capability
- Planning
- Program Trades
- Resource Allocation
- Management
- Organization
- Interoperability
- Conformance
- Leadership

Implementation Issues


- Process
- Product
- Information
- Capability
- Performance



ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
(Threats, Economy, Technology)

TAI Phase 2 Systemic Analysis

The analysis predicts an increasing gap between what is expected and what is capable of being achieved



Key Considerations

- ***Need to establish performance parameters that can be implemented with success across the life of the program***
 - ***Feasible plan***
 - ***Understood constraints***
 - ***Change tolerance***
- ***Need to improve the capabilities of the development teams***
 - ***Real systems engineering***
 - ***Funded management and technical approaches critical to interoperability***
 - ***Foundational processes reinforced***
 - ***Process capability in addition to process adherence***

Key Considerations

- ***Need to ensure that all program stakeholders agree on an integrated strategy for attacking the high priority overarching program issues:***
 - ***Congress and enterprise***
 - ***Program team***
 - ***Education and technology infrastructures***
- ***Need to augment acquisition policy with:***
 - ***A clear understanding of the complex interactions and constraints that programs are faced with***
 - ***Adequate implementation guidance***
 - ***Directed education***

Next in Systemic

- ***“User Designed” systemic information products***
- ***Systemic Analysis technology improvements***
 - ***Data quality***
 - ***Time phased analysis***
 - ***Predictive analysis***
 - ***Relative impact analysis***
- ***More assessments added to the program base***
- ***Initial Systemic Analysis technology partnerships***
 - ***CeBase***
 - ***NAVAIR***
 - ***Lockheed Martin***

Summary

- ***Systemic analysis based on objective program assessment results provides a unique opportunity to use actual data to make a difference***
- ***The causes of program performance shortfalls are extremely complex - improvement strategies and associated action plans must address this complexity***
- ***As an Enterprise we need to start by re-addressing the performance issues we thought we were already fixing***

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Executive for Performance Management

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